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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a two-country monetary union new Keynesian general equilibrium model
with housing and collateral constraints, to be calibrated for Lithuania and the rest of the euro area.
Within this setting, and following the recent entrance of Lithuania in the EMU, the aim of this paper
is twofold. First, we study how shocks are transmitted di¤erently in the two regions, considering the
recent common monetary policy. Then, we analyze how macroprudential policies should be conducted
in Lithuania, in the context of the EMU. As a macroprudential tool, we propose a decentralized Taylor-
type rule for the LTV which responds to national deviations in output and house prices. We nd
that, given the housing market features in Lithuania, common shocks are transmitted more strongly
in this country than in the rest of the euro area. In terms of macroprudential policies, results show
that the optimal policy in Lithuania with respect to the euro area may have a di¤erent intensity and
that it delivers substantial benets in terms of nancial stability.
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"As a result of the recent global nancial and economic crisis, the right consensus seems to be emerg-
ing that business cycles, which have been predominantly caused by credit growth accelerations, should
be addressed with both, monetary and macroprudential policies. The MacroPru arm should be much
stronger than the monetary policy arm due to a) its superior distributional e¤ects and b) e¤ectiveness".
Raimondas Kuodis, Deputy Chairman of the Board, The Bank of Lithuania, remarks at the Conference
on European Economic Integration (CEEI), November 2014
1 Introduction
Lithuania lost its ability to set interest rates and conduct monetary policy since the decision to follow
a xed exchange rate regimes to the euro. Now being part of the euro area itself, the country is fully
integrated in the system. This has crucial implications for the Lithuanian economy given that interest-
rate decisions are made in favor of the euro area as a whole, with Lithuania only a tiny part in the
decision making. Furthermore, some of the specic characteristics of the housing market in Lithuania
can result in the single monetary policy being transmitted in this economy in a way that is di¤erent
than in other countries.
There are some particularities in the Lithuanian housing markets that make it di¤erent from its euro
area partners. One of these di¤erences is, for example, mortgage contracts. Housing loans (and loans
to non-nancial corporations, NFCs) in Lithuania are almost exclusively made at variable interest rates
(which are set for xed periods, e.g. of up to 1 year), which are quick to respond to changes in borrowing
costs in the nancial markets.1 In the beginning of 2013, about 70 per cent of new loans to households
were issued at exible interest rates. In 2014 and 2015, the proportion increased to more than 80 per
cent (in 2015 the share of exible rate loans, for both households and NFCs, reached 90 per cent).2 In
the big countries of the euro area, however, the majority of of households take mortgages at a xed
rate.3 For France and Germany the ratio of exible-rate loans is pretty low, around 12 per cent and
15 per cent respectively, while in Spain reaches 82 per cent. This high heterogeneity is reected in an
average percentage of exible-rate mortgage in the euro area of 45 per cent (the correspective percentage
of xed-rate loans is therefore 55 per cent).
Another issue of concern, now that Lithuania is part of the euro area, is how to correctly implement
1See Karmaziene and Varanauskiene (2014).
2Data from the website of the Bank of Lithuania (Statistics).
3See Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer (2014) on data from ECB. They report the share of exible-rate mortgages among the
oldest active mortgages related to the household main residence.
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policies to promote nancial stability, in accordance with the other members. The economy of Lithuania
has su¤ered from the same nancial stability problems stemming from the crisis as other countries. And
as other economies, it has been trying to recover ever since and it has in fact fully recovered in terms of
economic activity. The banking sector is, in any case, far better prepared to withstand such turbulences
than in the outset of the most recent economic downturn. Recently, in the Financial Stability Review
(Bank of Lithuania, 2015), it has been stressed that despite the growth of domestic economy and the
improvements in the nancial health of the private sector, credit activity remained subdued in 2014
and in the rst half of 2015. However, irrespective of the better preparedness of the banking sector to
withstand shocks, the overall conditions remain challenging. It is of utmost importance that the banking
sector is not only capable of absorbing the previous shocks, but is also adequately prepared to face any
new systemic risks and ensure su¢ cient credit availability for the real sector under the least favourable
conditions.
Lithuania, as a new member of the euro area, has to implement its macroprudential policies in the
context of this new economic setting, by interacting with the other monetary union members, that
indeed share the same monetary policy. The Bank of Lithuania pursues macroprudential policy at the
national level and monitors, assesses, and does its best to limit the macroprudential risk for the stability
of the domestic nancial system; in doing so it has the possibility to cooperate with the ECB and other
national and international institutions. One of the intermediate objectives that the Bank of Lithuania
has set is to mitigate excessive credit growth and too high leverage.
In this paper, we aim rst at illustrating the monetary policy transmission in Lithuania in the context
of the euro area. Then, we propose the implementation of a macroprudential tool, based on the LTV4,
that aims at maximizing welfare.5 The basic modelling setup constitutes a two-country new Keynesian
DSGE model with nancial frictions. In each country, there is a group of individuals that are credit
constrained and need housing collateral to obtain loans. Countries trade goods, and savers in each
country have access to foreign assets. Within this setting, we study how macroprudential policies should
be conducted in Lithuania, in the context of the euro area. As a macroprudential tool, we propose
4 In our model, the LTV ratio will be calibrated to match the average (market) LTV in steady state. However the market
LTV can vary depending on economic conditions and it may be di¤erent with respect to the imposed LTV cap set by
authority. When the LTV cap is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint in this model is
binding, borrowers will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore
restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain.
5Here we follow Angelini et al. (2014) in which they assume that the loss function in the economy also contains nancial
variables. Therefore, we use it as a proxy for nancial stability, which is seen as the actual aim of macroprudential policy
(Galati and Moessner, 2011).
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a decentralized Taylor-type rule for the LTV which responds to national deviations in credit from its
steady state. We also include the common monetary policy with a Taylor rule, consistent with the ECB
target of price stability, with interest-rate smoothing for interest-rate setting by a single central bank.
Results show that common shocks are transmitted in a stronger way in Lithuania than in the rest
of the euro area, given that the former country has variable-rate mortgages and a higher LTV cap than
its European partners. With respect to macroprudential policies, we nd that the optimal policy is that
Lithuania may have a di¤erent intensity in its LTV setting than the rest of the euro area, given that
monetary policy is more e¤ective in this country. We also nd that the LTV rule is welfare enhancing for
the whole monetary union, although there exists a welfare trade-o¤ between borrowers and savers. This
is explained because, on the one hand, macroprudential policies bring a more stable nancial system, on
the other hand, monetary policy may be less e¤ective and ination volatility can increase.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 brey adresses our main contribution, linking it to
the recent literature, section 3 describes the model, section 4 presents the parameter values, section 5
presents the dynamics of the model, section 6 analyzes optimal macroprudential policies and section 7
concludes.
2 Literature review and our contribution
This paper relates to this policy making issue linking it to di¤erent strands of the literature. There is an
extensive literature that shows that institutional, consumption, nancial or housing market heterogeneity
can endanger the optimality of EMU as a currency area (See Maclennan et al., 1998; ECB, 2009;
Rubio, 2014). The model constitutes a two-country version of the seminal paper of Iacoviello (2005),
that introduces a nancial accelerator that works through the housing sector, in the avor of Aspachs
and Rabanal (2010). However, it introduces cross-country housing-market heterogeneity as in Rubio
(2014). This paper is also related to the recent literature on macroprudential and monetary policies
in Iacoviello-type models such in the aforementioned Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012) or Rubio and
Carrasco-Gallego (2013, 2014). However, it explores the issue in a two-country setting as in Brzoza-
Brzezina et al. (2015). The novelty of this paper is its special application to the case of Lithuania in a
2 countries framework with respect to the rest of the euro area. There is also some literature looking
at the response of the Lithuanian economy to a common ECB rate shock. In particular, Stak·enas and
Stasiukynait·e (2016), through an empirical structural VAR, look at the responses of GDP, HICP (excl.
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energy) and credit to non-nancial institutions and households in Lithuania (and to GDP and HICP
only for the euro area) due to a 100 bp increase in the Euribor. Their results are in line with some
previous studies such as Georgiadis (2015) and Errit and Uuskula (2014) concluding that the response
to a monetary policy shock coming from the euro area is quite substancial.
3 Model Setup
We consider an innite-horizon, two-country economy inside a monetary union. The home country is
denoted by LIT and the rest of the union by EUR. Households consume, work, and demand real estate.
There is a nancial intermediary in each country that provides mortgages and accepts deposits from
consumers. Each country produces one di¤erentiated intermediate good, but households consume goods
from both countries. For simplicity, housing is a non-traded good. We assume that labor is immobile
across the countries.6 Firms follow a standard Calvo problem (after Calvo, 1983). In this economy, both
nal and intermediate goods are produced. Prices are sticky in the intermediate-goods sector. Monetary
policy is conducted by a single central bank that responds to a weighted average of ination in both
countries. Analogous to the setting of the interest rate, there is a rule for the setting of the LTV, which
serves as a macroprudential measure. We allow for housing-market heterogeneity across the countries.
3.1 The Consumers Problem
There are three types of consumers in each country: unconstrained consumers, constrained consumers
who borrow at a variable rate, and constrained consumers who borrow at a xed rate. The proportion
of each type of borrower is xed and exogenous.7 Consumers can be constrained or unconstrained in the
sense that constrained individuals need to collateralize their debt repayments in order to borrow from
the nancial intermediary. Interest payments in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of the future
value of the current house stock. In this way, the nancial intermediary ensures that borrowers are going
to be able to fulll their debt obligations in the next period. As in Iacoviello (2005), We assume that
6This is a standard simplifying assumption, since the focus of the paper is on nancial markets. We aknowledge the
fact that labor mobility has been a factor within the euro area, however is not covered here. This is especially true for
Lithuania. This resulted in labor shortage in the country and a signicant emigration.
7According to the European Mortgage Federation, the type of mortgage contracts across countries responds to a large
extent to institutional or cultural factors, which are out of the scope of the present model. In the short run, the proportion
of each type of mortgage contract can uctuate, but, typically, it does not imply a change in the xed- or variable-rate
category of the country.
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constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones.8 There is a nancial intermediary
in each country. The nancial intermediary in each country accepts deposits from domestic savers, and
it extends both xed- and variable-rate loans to domestic borrowers.
3.1.1 Unconstrained Consumers (Savers)
Unconstrained consumers in LIT maximize as follows:
max E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCut + j lnH
u
t  
(Lut )



; (1)
Here, E0 is the expectation operator,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor for savers, and Cut , Hut , and Lut
are consumption at t, the stock of housing, and hours worked, respectively. j represents the weight of
housing in the utility function. 1= (   1) is the aggregate labor-supply elasticity.
Consumption is a bundle of domestically and foreign-produced goods, dened as: Cut = (C
u
LIT t)
n (CuEURt)
1 n ;
where n is the size of LIT.
The budget constraint for LIT is as follows:
PLITtC
u
LIT t + PEURtC
u
EURt +QLITtH
u
t +RLITt 1B
u
t 1 +Rt 1Dt 1 +
 
2
D2t  QtHut 1+
W ut L
u
t +B
u
t +Dt + PLITtFt + PLITtSt; (2)
where PLITt and PEURt are the prices of the goods produced in Countries LIT and EUR, respectively, Qt
is the housing price in LIT, Hut is the stock of housing and W
u
t is the wage for unconstrained consumers.
But represents domestic bonds denominated in the common currency. RLITt is the nominal interest rate
in LIT. Positive bond holdings signify borrowing, and negative signify savings. However, as we will
see, this group will choose not to borrow at all: they are the savers in this economy. Dt are foreign-
bond holdings by savers in LIT, who have indeed access to the international nancial market. Rt is
the nominal rate of foreign bonds, which are denominated in euros. As is common in the literature,
to ensure stationarity of net foreign assets we introduced a small quadratic cost of deviating from zero
foreign borrowing,  2D
2
t . Savers obtain interest on their savings. St and Ft are lump-sum prots received
from the rms and the nancial intermediary in LIT, respectively.
8This assumption ensures that the borrowing constraint is binding in the steady state and that the economy is endoge-
nously split into borrowers and savers.
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Dividing by PLITt, we can rewrite the budget constraint in terms of goods LIT9:
CuLIT t+
PEURt
PLITt
CuEURt+qLITtH
u
t +
RLITt 1but 1
LITt
+
Rt 1dt 1
LITt
+
 
2
d2t  qLITtHut 1+wut Lut +but +dt+Ft+St;
(3)
where LITt denotes ination for the goods produced in LIT, dened as PLITt=PLITt 1:
Maximizing (1) subject to (3) ; we obtain the rst-order conditions for the unconstrained group:
CuLIT t
CuEURt
=
nPEURt
(1  n)PLITt (4)
1
CuLIT t
= Et

RLITt
LITt+1CuLIT t+1

; (5)
1   dt
CuLIT t
= Et

Rt
LITt+1CuLIT t+1

; (6)
wut = (L
u
t )
 1 CuLIT t
n
; (7)
j
Hut
=
n
CuLIT t
qLITt   Et n
CuLIT t+1
qLITt+1: (8)
Equation (4) equates the marginal rate of substitution between goods to the relative price. Equation (5)
is the Euler equation for consumption. Equation (6) is the rst-order condition for net foreign assets.
Equation (7) is the labor-supply condition. These equations are standard. Equation (8) is the Euler
equation for housing and states that at the margin the benets from consuming housing have to be equal
to the costs.
Combining (5) and (6) we obtain a non-arbitrage condition between home and foreign bonds:10
RLITt =
Rt
(1   dt) : (9)
Since all consumption goods are traded and there are no barriers to trade, we assume in this paper
9The variables in small letters are taken divided by PLITt:
10The log-linearized version of this equation could be interpreted as the uncovered interest-rate parity.
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that the law of one price holds:
PLITt = P

LITt; (10)
where variables with a star denote foreign variables and P LITt is the foreign price of goods produced at
home.
3.1.2 Constrained Consumers (Borrowers)
Constrained consumers in LIT are of two types: those who borrow at a variable rate and those who
do so at a xed rate. The di¤erence between them is the interest rate they are charged. The variable-
rate constrained consumer faces RLITt, which will coincide with the rate set by the central bank. The
xed-rate borrower pays RLITt, derived from the nancial intermediarys problem. The proportion of
variable-rate consumers in LIT is constant and exogenous and is equal to LIT 2 [0; 1].
Constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones, that is e <  in terms of
discount factors for borrowers and savers respectively. Constrained consumers face a collateral con-
straint: the expected debt repayment in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of the expectation
of tomorrows value of todays stock of housing:
Et
RLITt
LITt+1
bcvt  kLITtEtqLITt+1Hcvt ; (11)
Et
RLITt
LITt+1
bcft  kLITtEtqLITt+1Hcft ; (12)
where equations (11) and (12) represent the collateral constraint for the variable- and xed-rate borrower,
respectively. kLITt can be interpreted as the loan-to-value ratio in LIT. Notice that such models with
collateral constraints, the LTV is typically considered exogenous. At the macroeconomic level, LTVs
partly depend on exogenous factors such as regulation. This parameter is usually calibrated to match
the average (market) LTV in the country analyzed.11 However, in this model, it can vary depending
on economic conditions, as a macroprudential policy variable.12 For the setting of the xed interest
11Due to data availability, we use the average new loansLTV at origination.
12 It has to be taking into account that in reality, macroprudential LTV caps are not always binding. Even a stable LTV
cap inherently has a countercyclical e¤ect as it is less binding after a crisis but is likely to become more binding as credit
and housing prices pick up during the nancial cycle (Matk·enait·e et al., 2016).
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rate, RLITt, we follow Rubio (2011). We assume that there a nancial intermediary in each country
that accepts deposits from savers and extends both xed and variable-rate mortgages to borrowers. For
the two types of mortgage to be o¤ered, the xed-interest rate has to be such that the intermediary
is indi¤erent between lending at a variable or xed rate. RLITt will be an aggregate interest rate that
contains information on all the past xed-interest rates associated with past debt. Each period, this
aggregate interest rate is updated with a new xed interest rate that is an average discount average of
all future variable interest rates.
Without loss of generality, we present the problem for the variable-rate borrower since for the xed
rate it is symmetrical. Variable-rate borrowers maximize their lifetime utility function:
max E0
1X
t=0
etlnCcvt + j lnHcvt   (Lcvt )

; (13)
where Ccvt = (C
cv
LIT t)
n (CcvEURt)
1 n ; subject to the budget constraint (in terms of good LIT):
CcvLIT t +
PEURt
PLITt
CcvEURt + qLITtH
cv
t +
RLITt 1bcvt 1
LITt
 qLITtHcvt 1 + wcvt Lcvt + bcvt ; (14)
and subject to the collateral constraint (11). Notice that variable-rate borrowers repay all debt every
period and acquire new debt at the current new interest rate. This assumption implies that the interest
rate on variable-rate mortgages is revised every period for the whole stock of debt and changed according
to the policy rate.13 To make the problem for xed-rate borrowers symmetrical and analogous to
existing models with borrowing constraints, we assume the same debt-repayment structure for this type
of borrower. Obviously, xed-rate contracts are not revised every period. However, to make the model
more realistic, but still tractable, the xed-interest rate will be such that a revised xed rate will be
applied only on new debt, keeping constant the interest rate applied to existing debt. In this way, we
reconcile the structure of the model with the fact that xed-rate contracts are long term.
The rst-order conditions for these consumers are as follows:
CcvLIT t
CcvEURt
=
nPEURt
(1  n)PLITt (15)
13This assumption is consistent with reality, in which variable-interest rates are revised very frequently and changed
according to an interest-rate index tied to the interest rate set by the central bank.
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nCcvLIT t
= eEt nRLITt
LITt+1CcvLIT t+1

+ cvt RLITt; (16)
wcvt = (L
cv
t )
 1 CcvLIT t
n
; (17)
j
Hcvt
=
n
CcvLIT t
qLITt   eEt n
CcvLIT t+1
qLITt+1   cvt kLITtEtqLITt+1LITt+1: (18)
These rst-order conditions di¤er from those of unconstrained individuals. In the case of constrained
consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint (cvt ) appears in equations (16) and
(18). As in Iacoviello (2005), the borrowing constraint is always binding, so that constrained individuals
borrow the maximum amount they are allowed, and their saving is zero. The problem for consumers is
analogous in country EUR.
3.2 Firms
3.2.1 Final-Goods Producers
In LIT, there is a continuum of nal-goods producers that aggregate intermediate goods according to
the production function:
Y kLIT t =
Z 1
0
Y kLIT t (z)
" 1
" dz
 "
" 1
; (19)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
The total demand of intermediate-good z is given by YLITt (z) =

PLITt(z)
PLITt
 "
YLITt; and the price
index is PLITt =
hR 1
0 PLITt (z)
1 " dz
i 1
" 1
:
3.2.2 Intermediate-Goods Producers
The intermediate-goods market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005), intermedi-
ate goods are produced according to the following production function:
YLITt (z) = t (L
u
t (z))
LIT (Lct (z))
(1 LIT ) ; (20)
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where t represents technology. We assume that log t =  log t 1 + ut, where  is the autoregressive
coe¢ cient and ut is a normally distributed shock to technology. LIT 2 [0; 1] measures the relative size
of each group in terms of labor14. Lct is labor supplied by constrained consumers, dened as LITL
cv
t +
(1  LIT )Lcft .
The rst-order conditions for labor demand are the following:15
wut =
1
Xt
LIT
YLITt
Lut
; (21)
wcvt = w
cf
t =
1
Xt
(1  LIT ) YLITt
Lct
; (22)
where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.
The price-setting problem for the intermediate-goods producers is a standard Calvo-Yun case. An
intermediate-goods producer sells goods at price PLITt (z) ; and 1   is the probability of being able to
change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price POPTLIT t (z) solves the following:
1X
k=0
()k Et

t;k

POPTLIT t (z)
PLITt+k
  "= ("  1)
Xt+k

Y OPTLIT t+k (z)

= 0: (23)
The aggregate price level is given as follows:
PLITt =
h
P 1 "LIT t 1 + (1  )
 
POPTLIT t
1 "i1=(1 ")
: (24)
Using (23) and (24) and log-linearizing, we can obtain the standard forward-looking Phillips curve16.
The rm problem is similar in EUR.
3.3 Aggregate Variables and Market Clearing
Given LIT ; the fraction of variable-rate borrowers in LIT, we can dene aggregates across constrained
consumers as the sum of variable-rate and xed-rate aggregates, so that Cct  LITCcvt +(1  LIT )Ccft ;
Hct  LITHcvt + (1  LIT )Hcft and bct  LIT bcvt + (1  LIT ) bcft :
Therefore, economy-wide aggregates in LIT are Ct  Cut + Cct , Lt  Lut + Lct . The aggregate supply
14 It can be seen as labor-income share and proxy for the di¤erences in debt to GDP.
15Symmetry across rms allows avoiding index z:
16The Phillips curve is as the following: ^LITt = ^LITt+1   ekx^t + uLITt,where x^ is 1/real marginal cost and ek =
[(1  )(1  )=]:
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of housing is xed, so that market clearing requires Ht  Hut +Hct = H.17
The market clearing condition for the nal good in LIT is nYLITt = nCLITt + (1  n)CLITt +
n 2 d
2
t . Domestic nancial markets clear: b
c
t = b
u
t : The world bond market clearing condition is ndt +
(1  n) PEURtPLITt dt = 0; where dt denotes the foreign bonds in real terms. The net foreign asset position
follows dt =
Rt 1
(1  dt)LITtdt 1 + YLITt   CLITt  
PEURt
PLITt
CEURt. Everything is similar in EUR.
3.4 Monetary Policy
The model closes with a Taylor rule, with interest-rate smoothing for interest-rate setting by a single
central bank,18
Rt = (Rt 1)
h
(LITt)
n (EURt)
(1 n)
i(1+)
R
1 
"R;t; (25)
0    1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia. (1 + ) measures the sensitivity of
interest rates to current ination. "R;t is a white noise shock process with zero mean and variance 2" . R
is the interest rate in steady state. This rule is consistent with the primary objective of the ECB being
price stability.
3.5 Macroprudential Policy
As an approximation for a macroprudential policy, we consider a Taylor-type rule for the loan-to-value
ratio. In standard models, the LTV ratio is a xed parameter which is not a¤ected by economic condi-
tions. However, we can think of regulations of LTV ratios as a way to moderate credit booms. When the
LTV (cap) ratio is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint here is binding,
borrowers will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and
therefore restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain. Recent research on macroprudential policies has
proposed Taylor-type rules for the LTV ratio so that it reacts inversely to variables such that the growth
rates of GDP, credit, the credit-to-GDP ratio or house prices.19 We decided to make the rule more
17An endogenous supply of housing could be easily introduced in a two-sector version of this model. However, the
qualitative results would not change for the demand side of the model which is the focus of this paper. For two-sector
models, see, for example, Iacoviello and Smets (2006) or Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
18This type of rule is also used in other monetary-union models. See Iacoviello and Smets (2006) or Aspachs and Rabanal
(2008). Furthermore, as shown in Iacoviello (2005) and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2013), a rule that only responds to
ination enhances the nancial accelerator.
19With a macroprudential orientation, Kannan et al., (2012) also examine a monetary policy rule that reacts to prices,
output and changes in collateral values with a macroprudential instrument based on the LTV; Funke and Paetz (2012)
consider a non-linear version of a macroprudential rule for the LTV.
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parsimonious allowing the LTV ratio to eract to borrowing. This will help for a further study on the
interactions with monetary policy. These rules can be a simple illustration of how a macroprudential
policy could work in practice. Here, we assume that there exists a macroprudential Taylor-type rule
for the LTV ratio, so that it responds to deviations of credit from its steady state.20 We consider a
decentralized macroprudential policy in which each country can implement its own rule:
kLITt = kSSLIT

bLITt
bLIT
 kLIT
; (26)
kEURt = kSSEUR

bEURt
bEUR
 kEUR
: (27)
where kSSLIT ; bLIT are the steady-state values for the loan-to-value ratio and borrowing in LIT. kLIT  0
measures the response of the loan-to-value to deviations of borrowing from its steady state. This kind
of rule would be countercyclical, delivering a lower LTV ratio in credit booms, therefore restricting the
credit in the economy.
3.6 Welfare Measure
In order to provide a measure for welfare, we numerically evaluate how cross-country asymmetries a¤ect
welfare for a given policy rule and for technology shocks. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2012),
the two approaches that have recently been used for welfare analysis in DSGE models include either
characterizing the optimal Ramsey policy, or solving the model using a second-order approximation to
the structural equations for given policy and then evaluating welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino
and Pescatori (2007), we take this latter approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of the three types
of agents separately.21 The individual welfare for savers and borrowers in LIT is dened, respectively,
as follows:
20We have also experimented with rules that react to output and house prices and results for the dynamics of the model
are similar. The rst variable would correspond to the objective of the macroprudential regulator to moderate booms in
the economy that could lead to an excessive credit growth. Drehmann et al. (2010) also point out that the deviations
of credit from its long-term trend are very good indicators of the increase in systemic risk, which is the macroprudential
attention. As for the house prices, given collateral constraints, they are the key causal variable for the dynamics of loans
to households, and it appears to correspond to the actual behavior of policymakers (Angelini et al., 2012).
21We used the software Dynare to obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by solving a second-order
approximation to the constraints, then evaluating welfare under the policy using this approximate solution, as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004). See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous
consumers.
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Vu;t  Et
1X
m=0
m
 
lnCut+m + j lnH
u
t+m  
 
Lut+m


!
; (28)
Vcv;t  Et
1X
m=0
em lnCcvt+m + j lnHcvt+m    Lcvt+m
!
; (29)
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we dene social welfare in LIT as a weighted sum of the
individual welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
Vt = (1  )Vu;t +

1  e [AVcv;t + (1  A)Vcf;t] : (30)
Borrowers and saverswelfare are weighted by

1  e and (1  ) ; respectively, so that the two groups
receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream. Everything is symmetrical for
EUR.
Total welfare is dened as a weighted sum of the welfare in the two countries:
Wt = nVt + (1  n)V t : (31)
In order to make the results more intuitive, we present welfare changes in terms of consumption
equivalents. We use as a benchmark the welfare evaluated when the macroprudential policy is not active
and compare it with the welfare obtained when such policy is implemented.22
4 Parameter Values
Parameters are calibrated to reect the economy of Lithuania and the rest of the euro area. Some of
the parameters are standard and are common for both economies and some others will be specically
calibrated for each country. Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of the parameter values.
Discount factors are set to be common in both economies, following the standard values in the
literature. The discount factor for savers, , is set to 0:99.23 The discount factor for borrowers, e, is set
to 0:98.24 The steady-state weight of housing in the utility function, j, is set to 0:12 and 0:14, in the
euro area and Lithuania, respectively. This parameter pins down the ratio of housing wealth to GDP,
22We follow Ascari and Ropele (2009).
23Since the seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1982), the literature on DSGE models considers a calibrated value
of the discount factor of 0.99 as the standard value for this parameter.
24Lawrance (1991) estimated discount factors for poor consumers at between 0:95 and 0:98 at quarterly frequency.
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since the latter in the steady state is a function of this parameter.25 We set  = 2, implying a value
of the labor supply elasticity of 1:26 For the loan-to-value ratio we consider a steady-state value of 0.68
and 0.78, for the euro area and Lithuania, respectively, taking the LTV ratio observed in the data.27
The labor-income share of unconstrained consumers, , is set to 0:7.28 We pick a value of 6 for ", the
elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods. This value implies a steady-state markup of 1:2.
The probability of not changing prices, , is set to 0:75, implying that prices change every four quarters
on average. For the Taylor rule parameters, we used  = 0:8,  = 0:5: The rst value reects a realistic
degree of interest-rate smoothing.29  is consistent with the original parameters proposed by Taylor in
1993. We consider , the proportion of variable-rate mortgages, to be 0.45 and 0.82, in the euro area and
Lithuania, respectively. The size of Lithuania is considered to be 0.35%.30 A technology shock was a 1
per cent positive technology with 0.9 persistence.31 Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of the parameter
values.
Table 1: Country-specic parameter values
EUR LIT
j 0:12 0:14 Weight of housing in utility function
k 0:68 0:78 Average loan-to-value ratio
 0:45 0:82 Degree of variability of interest rate
n 0:9965 0:0035 Country size
25Following Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we use 1.2, value that reects the ratio of housing wealth to GDP across most
industrialized countries as a proxy for the euro area. This ratio is higher though in Lithuania.
26Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) showed
that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimate could have a downward bias of 50 per cent.
27Note that the macroprudential LTV cap in Lithuania since 2011 is 85 per cent, which is higher than the average LTV
in the last decade.
28This value is in the range of the estimates of Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) for the US, and Campbell
and Mankiw (1991) for the US, Canada, France, and Sweden. Therefore, we take it as valid for most of the countries of the
euro area.
29See McCallum (2001).
30Even though Lithuania is such a small country, we still want to keep a two-country setting to be able to study the
interaction between policies in Lithuania and the rest of the euro area and potentially centralized vs. decentralized policies.
31This high persistence value for technology shocks is consistent with what is commonly reported in the literature. Smets
and Wouters (2002) estimated a value of 0.822 for this parameter in Europe; Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimated it as 0.93
for the US.
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Table 2: Common parameter Values
 :99 Discount factor for saverse :98 Discount factor for borrowers
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
 :70 Labor-Income share for savers
" 6 Elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods
 0:8 Interest-rate smoothing in Taylor rule
 :5 Ination parameter in Taylor rule
 0:9 Technology shock persistence
5 Shock Transmission
In this section, we study rst the dynamics of the model by showing impulse-responses to a monetary
policy shock, a technology shock and a house price shock, abstracting from macroprudential policies,
and using the parameter values shown in the previous section. Given the structural di¤erences between
Lithuania and the rest of the euro zone, the same monetary policy shock, coming from the ECB, is
potentially going to be transmitted in a di¤erent way in Lithuania. Other shocks, i.e. technology and
housing demand, even if they are common, will have a di¤erent impact on the two economies and will
have to be accommodated by the single monetary policy.
5.1 Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
Figure 1 presents impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. This represents a decrease in the
interest rate by the ECB. The common monetary policy shock is transmitted to both economies in a
di¤erent way. Although the e¤ects on house prices and ination are very similar for Lithuania and the
rest of the euro area, the e¤ects on borrowing di¤er. In particular, we see that in Lithuania the increase
in borrowing is stronger than in the rest of the euro area. Lithuania is an economy in which rates are
variable, as opposed to the big countries of the EMU. Therefore, the same drop in the policy rate is
transmitted in a direct way to the borrowing rate, causing credit to increase sharply. On the other hand,
the LTV in Lithuania is also larger than in the rest of the euro area. This creates a higher nancial
accelerator and thus, the same change in the interest rate and house prices a¤ect the collateral constraint
by more, making borrowing more sensitive to monetary policy changes. This stronger increase in credit
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy shock
creates an extra increase in consumption demand in Lithuania.
5.2 Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock
When there is a common technology shock, demand increases in a similar way in both countries (Figure
2). In the same way, ination decreases both in LIT and EUR and reduces the interest rate. The main
di¤erence comes in the nancial side. Given that Lithuania has a higher LTV than the rest of the Euro
area and the interest rate is variable, borrowing increases by more in Lithuania following the fall in the
common policy rate. As in the previous case, the increase of mortgaged houses is higher in Lithuania.
For this kind of shock, we observe a slightly larger increase in house prices in Lithuania, with respect to
the rest of the euro area.
5.3 Impulse Responses to a House Price Shock
Figure 3 describes impulse responses to a house price shock both in Lithuania and in the rest of the euro
area. We see from the gure that the house price shock is stronger in Lithuania and this causes credit to
increase by more in this country. This creates strong e¤ects on mortgaged houses and on consumption.
In the rest of the euro area, the e¤ects are similar but weaker.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Technology shock
6 Optimal Macroprudential Policy
In this section, we search for the optimal macroprudential policy, in the sense that it maximizes countrys
welfare. We assume that macroprudential policy is taken at a national level and that both countries
take the ECB policy as given when deciding on their macroprudential policies.
6.1 Optimal Parameters
Table 3 presents the optimized parameters for the macroprudential rules, in particular the ones described
in equations (26) and (27). We take monetary policy as given and search over the parameters that
maximize welfare in each country simultaneously.32
Table 3: Optimal Macroprudential Policy
bEUR 1:9
bLIT 0:7
The rst row of Table 3 corresponds to the optimal macroprudential policy in the rest of the euro
area. In the second row, Lithuania optimizes its macroprudential policy to maximize its welfare.33 We
32As in Angelini et al. (2014), given that regulations are not microfounded here, we adopt a positive approach along
the paper. Second-order values should not be taken as normative. That is, we take the presence of the macroprudential
regulator as given and study the e¤ects of the regulation on the economy.
33Here we follow Angelini et al. (2014) in which they assume that the loss function in the economy also contains
nancial variables, namely borrowing variability, as a proxy for nancial stability. Then, there would be a loss function
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a House Price shock
see that the optimal policy in Lithuania may have a di¤erent intensity compared to the rest of the euro
area. This is maily due to the variable rates that predominate in Lithuania. In the rest of the euro area,
with xed rates, monetary policy is less e¤ective and macroprudential policies can compensate for this
fact.
Table 4: Welfare Gain
EUR 4.40
Borrowers 10.25
Savers -0.52
LIT 0.40
Borrowers 1.45
Savers -0.42
Union 4.37
Then, in Table 4, using the optimal parameters just described above, we present the gains in terms
of welfare (in consumption equivalents) that implementing this optimal rule represents. As in Ascari
for the economy that would include not only the variability of output and ination but also the variability of borrowing:
L = 2 + y
2
y + 
2
b where 
2
; 
2
y and 
2
b are the variances of ination, output and borrowing. y  0, represents the
relative weight of the central bank to the stabilization of output.
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and Ropele (2009), we nd the constant fraction of steady-state consumption that would have to be
transferred to the agent if there were a welfare loss under the new parameterization.34 Here, a positive
value of consumption units represents a welfare increase, that is, how much the agent would pay in units
of consumption in order to be better o¤. A negative value means that welfare was decreasing, that is,
by how much an agent should be compensated in units of consumption. We take as a benchmark the
case in which there are no macroprudential policies in place.
We can observe from Table 4 that macroprudential policies are welfare enhancing in both regions.
In models with collateral constraints, macroprudential policies deliver welfare gains because of the ex-
ternality coming from the constraint. In this kind of models, the collateral constraint is always binding
and, therefore, borrowers are not able to smooth consumption as savers do. Thus, a policy that enhances
nancial stability brings them a more stable scenario with a more stable consumption path.35 However,
as usual in this kind of models, there is a trade-o¤ between borrowers and savers. Savers are worse o¤
with macroprudential policy because, in this model, the sticky-price assumption is creating a distortion
that a¤ects them. Since they are the owners of the rms, ideally they would like to live in a world in
which there is price stability, the goal of monetary policy. If monetary policy loses e¤ectiveness with
the presence of macroprudential policies, savers may not like the latter ones36. In the aggregate, the
economy benets from macroprudential policies but the gain is coming from the borrowers side.
34The consumption equivalent measure for the saver, as in Ascari and Ropele (2009) is given by 1  exp[(1 )(Vu;new  
Vu;old], and analogously for the other agents.
35 In other words, if the nancial system is very unstable and the asset prices (house prices in this framework) are very
volatile, borrowersconsumption will be also very volatile since it depends on the value of the collateral.
36Allowing for scal redistribution would bring a Pareto improvement. However, we do not consider scal mechanism
in this article. Our aim is here to stress the impact of optimal macroprudential policies for agents and inside the two
countries.
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Table 5: Volatilities
No Macropru Macropru
EUR
y 1.99 1.98
 0.22 0.23
b 3.23 0.55
LIT
y 1.99 1.98
 0.22 0.23
b 2.83 1.08
Table 5 displays both macroeconomic and nancial volatilities to help us understand where the wel-
fare gains come from. We calculate the standard deviations for output, ination and borrowing for
Lithuania and the rest of the euro area. Our benchmark is the case in which there are no macropru-
dential policies in place (rst column). Then, we see how these volatilities change when we consider the
optimized parameters obtained in Table 3 (second column of Table 5). We can observe that, when the
macroprudential policy is introduced, the economy benets from a more stable economy, both in terms
of output and borrowing.37 This comes at the expense of larger volatility of ination in our model,
because of the di¤erences that may arise between macroprudential and monetary policies, in the context
of supply-side shocks.38
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop a two-country DSGE model with housing to study the implications of the
entrance of Lithuania in the euro area. One of the countries is calibrated to reect the Lithuanian
economy, while the other one represents the rest of the euro area.
First, we study how common shocks transmit in a di¤erent way in both regions. In particular,
results show that common shocks (monetary policy, technology or house price shocks) are transmitted
in a stronger way in Lithuania than in the rest of the euro area, given that the former country has
variable-rate mortgages and a higher LTV ratio than its European partners.
37Notice that this macroprudential policy involves only a short-term output cost, since the policy does not represent a
change in the steady state. Welfare benets are long term.
38See Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015) for a detailed explanation of the policy conicts.
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Then, we analyze how macroprudential policies should be conducted in this context. We approximate
macroprudential policies as a rule for the (cap) LTV setting that responds to deviations of credit from its
steady state. With respect to macroprudential policies, we nd that the optimal policy is that Lithuania
may have a di¤erent intensity in its LTV setting than the rest of the euro area, given that monetary
policy is more e¤ective in this country. We also nd that the LTV rule is welfare enhancing for the
whole monetary union, although there exists a welfare trade-o¤ between borrowers and savers. This is
explained because, on the one hand, macroprudential policies bring a more stable nancial system but,
on the other hand, monetary policy may be less e¤ective and ination volatility can increase.
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